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Palliative Sedation: An ethical option of last-resort 
Rebecca A. McAteer 
Introduction 
In the wake of extensive discussion regarding the ethics of euthanasia and physician 
assisted suicide, a more subtle debate has arisen around the similarly controversial topic of 
terminal sedation.  I will begin this paper by offering a definition of what is meant by terminal 
(or palliative) sedation.  I will then attempt to lay a foundational context in which to examine the 
ethics of palliative sedation, concluding with some suggested guidelines for evaluating situations 
in which palliative sedation may or may not be an ethically acceptable option.  This paper aims 
to show that palliative sedation has not been made obsolete by recent advances in pain 
management and symptom control.  Instead, it retains a vital role in the appropriate palliative 
care management of select patients at the end of life.  Palliative sedation, rather than being 
merely a disguised form of euthanasia  –  so-called “slow euthanasia”  –  is a morally distinct, 
ethically permissible practice when exercised within appropriate limits. 
There are generally three main standpoints taken in the literature on palliative sedation. 
The first is that it is never ethically acceptable, usually because it is seen as incompatible with 
the Sanctity of Life Doctrine, particularly also when stipulated that artificial hydration and 
nutrition be withheld or withdrawn following the initiation of sedation.1  The other two 
viewpoints center around palliative sedation as either (1) a permissible last-resort measure or (2) 
an option to be offered among others at the request of patients.2  I here advocate for the former, 
that palliative sedation should only be offered as a last-resort measure to address suffering 
directly related to a patient’s underlying physiologic illness.   
Palliative Sedation: Some Definitions 
Since one of the sources of greatest confusion in this debate is over the meaning of 
“terminal sedation,” it is necessary to clarify its definition, which I feel is better termed 
“palliative sedation” or “sedation in the imminently dying.”3  Palliative sedation is the 
administration of sedatives in order to provide relief for terminally ill patients suffering from 
severe, treatment-refractory symptoms specifically related to their underlying physiologic illness. 
There are rare occasions when the dose of sedatives required to achieve this end results in 
complete sedation to unconsciousness.  This is distinct from the sedation that comes as a side-
effect of high-dose opioid therapy for pain and dyspnea management in terminally ill patients, 
because sedation is directly aimed at in this definition of palliative sedation.  However, I will 
show that these are not morally distinct practices since the need for palliative sedation should 
arise only in cases of last resort.  In such (admittedly rare) cases, I believe that sedatives should 
be administered in increasing doses only until an adequate comfort level is achieved; sedation is 
both the effect and the means of relief in this last-resort scenario. 
The language of this topic varies widely.  More importantly, as Lynn Jansen and Daniel 
Sulmasy argue, the phrase “terminal sedation” “encompass[es] a variety of practices, some of 
which are morally distinct from one another in important ways.”4  They reject the ambiguous, 
potentially misleading phrase “terminal sedation” in favor of a proposed distinction between two 
separate practices, “sedation of the imminently dying” and “sedation toward death.”4  These are 
distinguished primarily on the basis of the clinician’s intent in administering sedative 
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medications (that of providing comfort without necessarily hastening death) and the medical 
appropriateness of symptom management (proportionality of the measures employed). 
Depending on how palliative sedation is defined and utilized, it can be considered a practice 
morally distinct from both VAE and PAS.
Sedation of the imminently dying is indicated when a patient who is close to death (hours 
or days) suffers from one or more severe symptoms that are refractory to standard palliative care. 
The patient’s physician may then use vigorous, symptom-specific therapy that has a dose-
dependent side effect of sedation, a foreseen but unintended consequence of trying to relieve the 
patient’s symptoms.  Overly burdensome life-sustaining treatments may also be withdrawn.4  
While I feel that aiming at sedation is not itself inherently problematic, palliative sedation should 
never be initiated for the sake of sedation, in order to “treat consciousness” as the primary 
“refractory symptom.”  This practice is more consistent with sedation toward death, in which a 
patient who need not be imminently dying is treated with therapy intended to render him/her 
unconscious as a means of treating the refractory “symptom”  –  which is simply the 
consciousness that one is not yet dead  –  in conjunction with removal of other life-sustaining 
treatments to hasten death.4  Defined this way, sedation toward death is morally equivalent to 
voluntary active euthanasia (VAE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS). 
Distinguishing Between “Killing” and “Allowing to Die” 
One issue that surrounds the ethics of palliative sedation is whether there is a difference 
between killing and allowing to die.  I believe that such a distinction exists, and that it is both 
morally significant and relevant to this discussion.  I will define killing as an act resulting in 
death, performed with the intention of causing death.5  Conversely, allowing to die can be 
defined as withdrawing or withholding an intervention that forestalls or ameliorates a preexisting 
fatal condition, an act which may or may not be done with the intention causing death.5  Of note, 
“allowing to die” may be either active or passive depending on the circumstances, and it is the 
intention of the doer, rather than the degree of action required to fulfill that intention, that 
determines its moral permissibility.  Given these definitions, the traditional view of a physician’s 
role can be stated:  “All killing is wrong.  Some allowing to die is also wrong, while some is 
not.”5  I will only assert here that intending death is wrong, a claim that has been contested6 but 
one that I feel is well-supported.5,7   
Distinguishing Between “Intended” and “Foreseen” Consequences 
The distinction between consequences that are foreseen from those that are intended also 
requires a look at intentions.  This distinction underlies the vast majority of routine medical 
practice, in which treatments are administered with the intention of producing benefit for 
patients, but which come with the potential for known risks and burdensome side effects that are 
foreseen but unintended.  Such risks are generally accepted if they are proportionate to the 
expected benefits.  In palliative sedation, the intended effect is to relieve suffering, weighed 
against the foreseen but unintended potential to shorten life. 
  Palliative medicine presents a still more complex challenge, because cases arise in 
which the unintended side effect  – sedation, or even the hastening of death  –  may in fact be 
desired by both the patient and healthcare team.  Given the significant role of intentions in 
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intentions in greater detail. 
The Role of Intentions 
Critical to each of these distinctions is the presupposition that intentions are both 
knowable and morally significant.  However, those who reject this distinction frequently assert 
that intentions can be subjective and difficult to discern at best, if not entirely irrelevant.8,9,10
Citing Timothy Quill, Johannes van Delden states that “the intention of the physician is rather 
irrelevant in these cases…Intentions are to a large extent reconstructions of what one felt at the 
time of decision-making and they are hard to verify.”10  Nevertheless, this is an assertion, and 
one not necessarily borne out in reality.  It is at least sometimes possible to gain insight into 
one’s intentions from the objective conditions surrounding the particular situation.12  For 
example, a clinician would be hard-pressed to defend injecting a 100 mEq bolus of potassium 
chloride into a patient for reasons other than to cause death, given the fact that there is no 
conceivable diagnostic or therapeutic value in such a measure.  In clear-cut scenarios like this, 
intentions are readily discernable. 
  Yet in situations where intentions may be hard to know, even to the clinician 
him/herself, some questions may be useful in defining one’s intentions.  If an action is taken to 
remove an overly-burdensome medical intervention, “What would be the clinician’s feeling if 
the patient did not die as a result?”  Similarly, one might ask a physician, “If you could have 
relieved the pain in another way that had not hastened death, would you have done so?”11  If the 
answer here is no, then the physician most probably intended death by that action.  This process 
of examining motives essentially seeks to delineate the condition of fulfillment of the intention.5  
If an intention is fulfilled by completion of the action  –  and not necessarily by the death of the 
patient  –  then the intention is likely to be morally sound.  In situations of extreme suffering at 
the end of life, palliation of that suffering may also have an effect of hastening death.  This may 
be expected and even desired, but it should never be intended by means of palliative measures. 
The Roles of Proportionality and Double Effect 
Proportionality is a premise that underlies the rule of double effect, a concept frequently 
invoked as a basis for palliative sedation.  Despite arguments against its viability, the rule of 
double effect (RDE) continues to be an important, defensible guide for making sound ethical 
decisions in palliative care medicine.4  In the present context, the RDE states that if an action 
(palliative sedation) has two effects, one bad (sedation or hastened death) and the other good 
(symptom relief), then as long as the bad effect is not the cause of the good, there is 
proportionate reason to perform the action provided the agent foresees the bad but intends only 
the good.4   
In discussing the relevance of intentions to ethics, one might argue that proportionality 
alone is sufficient to determine what is proper, and that talk of intentions is unnecessary.10  Yet 
we must note that proportionality alone cannot determine the moral soundness of an action.  For 
instance, withdrawing futile treatment may arguably be the most proportionate action for a given 
patient, regardless of the clinician’s motive in doing so.  Yet such a utilitarian view fails to 
address the moral implications of a decision that may be proportionate but is nevertheless driven 
by motives that are inherently unethical.  Dan Brock’s hypothetical case of a greedy son who 
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disconnects his terminally ill mother’s ventilator in order to hasten her death and collect on 
insurance is a good illustration of this point.6  The greedy son’s action is clearly a grave 
wrongdoing, even though the action itself may be identical to that of the physician’s, who, being 
aware of her desire to be removed from the ventilator, intends to do so in accordance with the 
patient’s own informed decision.  These two actions are morally distinguishable only by the 
intention of the agent.  Death is foreseen in both situations; only in the former case is death 
necessarily intended, being itself the condition of fulfillment of the greedy son’s action.   
A Proposed Role for Palliative Sedation 
Based upon the ethical principles outlined above, several brief guidelines can be 
suggested for the appropriate use of palliative sedation in the clinical setting: 
The patient must have intense, intractable suffering that is directly and causally
related to his or her underlying physiological illness, for which the full extent of 
standard palliative care measures have been tried and found insufficient.13 
The patient must have a terminal illness without reasonable hope of present or
future curative intervention.13 
The patient must have given explicit, informed consent.  If incompetent to do so,
the patient’s wishes (as ascertained by knowledge of advance directives, 
substituted judgment and best interest) should dictate the decision.14 
Family input should be encouraged in reaching a consensus decision.
The second opinion of a palliative care expert may be warranted, particularly in
cases where it is unclear whether last-resort measures are indicated.
Conclusion 
A saying attributed to the medieval medical tradition describes the role of the physician 
as one called upon to “cure sometimes, relieve often, and comfort always.”  Over the course of 
this discussion I have argued in favor of the claim that when relief is impossible, palliative 
sedation is one ethically-acceptable means of providing comfort to dying patients in extremis. 
The definition of this practice is itself controversial, but I have outlined what I feel is an ethically 
proper way to consider and employ it.  Arguments based on theories of intentionality, the 
principle of proportionality, and two significant ethical distinctions  –  that between killing and 
allowing to die and between foreseen and intended consequences  –  underlie the ethical basis for 
this assertion. 
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